Moussaoui - 9/11 patsy cover up - powdered toast man toasted cars
3 part story:1 - 20th hijacker = idiot
2 - LONDON (Mi6)
3 - Promotion for NOT investigating BOWMAN
1 - US appeals court upholds Moussaoui conviction for 9/11
Zacarias Moussaoui had challenged the validity of his original guilty plea
A US appeals court has upheld the conviction and sentence of 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui.
The only person charged in the US over the attacks, Moussaoui had originally pleaded guilty to conspiracy.
In 2006 he was sentenced to life in prison for his role in planning the attacks that killed nearly 3,000.
The appeals court in Virginia rejected his claim his conviction was invalid as the government had failed to provide evidence he could have used in defence.
"Moussaoui challenges the validity of his guilty plea and his sentences" on the various counts, the three-judge panel said in its ruling.
"We affirm Moussaoui's convictions and sentences in their entirety."
The appeals court also brushed aside Moussaoui's lawyers' claims that his guilty plea was invalid.
"The finality of the guilty plea, entered knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, stands," the court said in its statement.
During his original trial in 2005, he had testified that his role was to hijack a fifth plane and crash it into the White House.
After the verdict, Moussaoui changed his stance and denied any involvement in the attacks.
But lawyers from the US justice department told the appeal court that Moussaoui had wanted to plead guilty, even though this was against the advice of his lawyers.
At his appeal, his lawyers also argued that his preparations for the trial had been damaged because he was not aware of classified evidence held by the government that might have helped his case.
These claims were also thrown out by the appeals court, which said Moussaoui was both aware of his rights and knew the gist of the classified evidence in question.
Moussaoui is currently serving his life sentence in a super-maximum federal security prison in Colorado.
During his original trial, the jury in Alexandria, Virginia, ruled that Moussaoui's lies to US investigators after he was arrested led directly to at least one death on 9/11.
He was convicted of several counts of conspiracy - including to commit acts of terrorism and destroy aircraft - which carry the death penalty.
Though the prosecution had requested it, he was spared death because of a single vote against the penalty by an anonymous juror.
On August 16, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested by Harry Samit of the FBI and INS agents in Minnesota and charged with an immigration violation. Materials itemized when he was arrested included a laptop computer, two knives, flight manuals pertaining to Boeing's 747 aircraft, a flight simulator computer program, fighting gloves and shin guards, and a computer disk with information about crop dusting.
Some agents worried that his flight training had violent intentions, so the Minnesota bureau tried to get permission (sending over 70 emails in a week) to search his laptop, but they were turned down. FBI agent Coleen Rowley made an explicit request for permission to search Moussaoui's personal rooms. This request was first denied by her superior, Deputy General Counsel Marion "Spike" Bowman, and later rejected based upon FISA regulations (amended after 9/11 by the USA Patriot Act). Several further search attempts similarly failed.
- If the application for the FISA warrant had gone forward, agents would have found information in Moussaoui's belongings that linked him both to a major financier of the hijacking plot working out of Germany, and to a Malaysian al-Qaida boss who had met with at least two other hijackers while under surveillance by intelligence officials.
FBI Director Robert Mueller personally awards Marion (Spike) Bowman with a presidential citation and cash bonus of approximately 25 percent of his salary. [Salon, 3/3/2003] Bowman, head of the FBI’s national security law unit and the person who refused to seek a special warrant for a search of Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings before the 9/11 attacks (see August 28, 2001), is among nine recipients of bureau awards for “exceptional performance.” The award comes shortly after a 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report saying Bowman’s unit gave Minneapolis FBI agents “inexcusably confused and inaccurate information” that was “patently false.” [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 12/22/2002] Bowman’s unit was also involved in the failure to locate 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi after their names were put on a watch list (see August 28-29, 2001). In early 2000, the FBI acknowledged serious blunders in surveillance Bowman’s unit conducted during sensitive terrorism and espionage investigations, including agents who illegally videotaped suspects, intercepted e-mails without court permission, and recorded the wrong phone conversations. [Associated Press, 1/10/2003] As Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) and others have pointed out, not only has no one in government been fired or punished for 9/11, but several others have been promoted: [Salon, 3/3/2003]
Richard Blee, chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, was made chief of the CIA’s new Kabul station in December 2001 (see December 9, 2001), where he aggressively expanded the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program (see Shortly After December 19, 2001). Blee was the government’s main briefer on al-Qaeda threats in the summer of 2001, but failed to mention that one of the 9/11 hijackers was in the US (see August 22-September 10, 2001).
In addition to Blee, the CIA also promoted his former director for operations at Alec Station, a woman who took the unit’s number two position. This was despite the fact that the unit failed to put the two suspected terrorists on the watch list (see August 23, 2001). “The leaders were promoted even though some people in the intelligence community and in Congress say the counterterrorism unit they ran bore some responsibility for waiting until August 2001 to put the suspect pair on the interagency watch list.” CIA Director George Tenet has failed to fulfill a promise given to Congress in late 2002 that he would name the CIA officials responsible for 9/11 failures. [New York Times, 5/15/2003]
Pasquale D’Amuro, the FBI’s counterterrorism chief in New York City before 9/11, was promoted to the bureau’s top counterterrorism post. [Time, 12/30/2002]
FBI Supervisory Special Agent Michael Maltbie, who removed information from the Minnesota FBI’s application to get the search warrant for Moussaoui, was promoted to field supervisor and goes on to head the Joint Terrorism Task Force at the FBI’s Cleveland office. [Salon, 3/3/2003; Newsday, 3/21/2006]
David Frasca, head of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit, is “still at headquarters,” Grassley notes. [Salon, 3/3/2003] The Phoenix memo, which was addressed to Frasca, was received by his unit and warned that al-Qaeda terrorists could be using flight schools inside the US (see July 10, 2001 and July 27, 2001 and after). Two weeks later Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested while training to fly a 747, but Frasca’s unit was unhelpful when local FBI agents wanted to search his belongings—a step that could have prevented 9/11 (see August 16, 2001 and August 20-September 11, 2001). “The Phoenix memo was buried; the Moussaoui warrant request was denied.” [Time, 5/27/2002] Even after 9/11, Frasca continued to “[throw] up roadblocks” in the Moussaoui case. [New York Times, 5/27/2002]
Dina Corsi, an intelligence operations specialist in the FBI’s bin Laden unit in the run-up to 9/11, later became a supervisory intelligence analyst. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 279-280 ; CNN, 7/22/2005] Corsi repeatedly hampered the investigation of Almihdhar and Alhazmi in the summer of 2001 (see June 11, 2001, Cole Investigator Repeatedly Asks FBI Headquarters for Information Leading to 9/11 Hijackers, but Gets Nothing')" onmouseout="return nd()">June 12-September 11, 2001, Before August 22, 2001, Cole Investigators, but FBI Headquarters Continues to Withhold It')" onmouseout="return nd()">August 27-28, 2001, Cole Investigator Receives Almihdhar Memo, FBI Headquarters Forces Him to Delete It')" onmouseout="return nd()">August 28, 2001, August 28-29, 2001, and (September 5, 2001)).
President Bush later names Barbara Bodine the director of Central Iraq shortly after the US conquest of Iraq. Many in government are upset about the appointment because of her blocking of the USS Cole investigation, which some say could have uncovered the 9/11 plot (see October 14-Late November, 2000). She did not apologize or admit she was wrong. [Washington Times, 4/10/2003] However, she is fired after about a month, apparently for doing a poor job.
An FBI official who tolerates penetration of the translation department by Turkish spies and encourages slow translations just after 9/11 was promoted (see March 22, 2002). [CBS News, 10/25/2002]
Entity Tags: Barbara Bodine, George W. Bush, Charles Grassley, David Frasca, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Michael Maltbie, Dina Corsi, Marion (“Spike”) Bowman, Robert S. Mueller III, Pasquale D’Amuro, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Rich B.
4 - additional info
Zacarias Moussaoui (Arabic: زكريا موسوي Zakariyyā Mūsawiy; sometimes Habib Zacarias Moussaoui; born May 30, 1968) is a French citizen who was convicted of conspiring to kill citizens of the USA as part of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As a result of his conviction, he is serving a life sentence without parole at the Federal ADX Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.
Marion (“Spike”) Bowman was a participant or observer in the following events:
A key Justice Department unit, the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR), is not consulted about a request to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings. Although it is this office that would submit an application for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the legal aspects of the application are discussed only with the National Security Law Unit, which is beneath the OIPR (see August 22-28, 2001). FBI officials discuss what they think the OIPR will want in a warrant application, but do not ask it directly. Sherry Sabol, an attorney in the lower National Security Law Unit, will later say that she would have contacted the OIPR to discuss a possible warrant application, if FBI headquarters agents had not withheld information from her (see August 22-28, 2001). When shown the relevant documentation for the Moussaoui case after 9/11, the OIPR’s general counsel will say he would have considered the application and, if submitted, he “would have tied bells and whistles” to a comment by Moussaoui’s imam that Moussaoui and an associate wanted to “go on jihad” (see August 17, 2001). [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 132-166, 182-4, 201 ] However, a memo from Attorney General John Ashcroft issued in May to improve the efficiency of the FISA process recommended communications between field offices, FBI headquarters, and the OIPR. In addition, the OIPR and the FBI should hold regular monthly meetings to discuss FISA warrants. It is unclear if such a meeting is held in the three weeks between Moussaoui’s arrest and 9/11. However, one of the people supposed to attend such meetings is Spike Bowman, chief of the National Security Law Unit, who is involved in the Moussaoui case (see August 28, 2001). [US Department of Justice, 5/18/2001 ]
Mike Maltbie and Rita Flack of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) forward a request for a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s belongings (see August 21, 2001) to National Security Law Unit chief Spike Bowman. The request was submitted by the Minneapolis field office (see August 22-28, 2001), which has been trying to obtain a warrant for some time. Earlier in the day, Maltbie edited the request, removing information connecting Moussaoui to al-Qaeda through a rebel group in Chechnya (see August 28, 2001). RFU chief Dave Frasca was to attend the meeting, but is called away at the last minute. According to Bowman, who is already very familiar with the facts in this case, Maltbie is adamant that there is not enough evidence to issue the warrant. Bowman agrees, saying that the evidence fails to implicate Moussaoui as an agent of a foreign power. The FBI thus abandons the effort to obtain a FISA warrant and begins planning his deportation (see (August 30-September 10, 2001)). [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 164-6, 168 ; US Department of Justice, 3/1/2006 ]
Moussaoui was alleged to have been a replacement for the "first" 20th hijacker, possibly Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh and Zakariyah Essabar were denied visas. However, prosecutors in Moussaoui's drawn-out trial had difficulty directly connecting him to the 19 participants.
Moussaoui's trial was seen in some circles as a barometer of the ability and willingness of the United States to give a fair hearing to terrorism suspects. Others objected to the degree to which the court and especially Judge Leonie Brinkema tolerated the bizarre and threatening courtroom behavior of Moussaoui. Moussaoui expressed contempt for the trial and court by introducing legal motions deriding Judge Brinkema, surprised onlookers by electing to represent himself in court, and rankled federal prosecutors by requesting the presence of captured al-Qaeda members as witnesses in his case. During the course of the proceedings, Moussaoui admitted his guilt in various degrees, and to being a member of al-Qaeda.
During the trial, Moussaoui initially stated that he was not involved in the September 11 attacks, but that he was planning an attack of his own. Some al-Qaeda members reportedly corroborated Moussaoui's statement to an extent, saying that he was involved in a plot other than September 11, but prosecutors believed that his story had no merit. On April 3, 2006, Moussaoui was found to be eligible for the death penalty. Before leaving the courtroom, he was reported to have shouted, "You will never get my blood. God curse you all!" Later that month he withdrew his qualifications and again admitted guilt on all charges levied by the prosecution.
On May 3, 2006, a jury decided against the death penalty for Moussaoui. The next day, he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. As he was led out of the courtroom, Moussaoui clapped his hands and said, "America, you lost... I won." Judge Brinkema responded by telling him that he would "die with a whimper" and "never get a chance to speak again." According to the Associated Press, three jurors decided Moussaoui had only limited knowledge of the September 11 plot, and three described his role in the attacks as minor, if he had any role at all.
Following sentencing, Moussaoui recanted his trial testimony stating he was not a member of the September 11, 2001 conspiracy, but "part of another al-Qaeda plot which was to occur after September 11."
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